


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and comprehendingly accept the same sentence while also exactly thesame belief. Holism is the contrary to the content of everybelief depends to a large degree of oneslated beliefs, and consequently that two people will rarely believe exactly the same thing. Holism may be defended by a slippery-slope argument. It seems that we can imagine Sanjays and Anis beliefs about the nature offish and the members of the class of fish slowly diverging. At somepoint, it will seem plainly correct to say that even though they mayboth say salmon are fish, they are not expressing thesame belief by that sentence. As an extreme case, we might imagine Anito be so frightened as to hold that to be a fish isneither more nor less than to be an Earthly animal in regular contactwith Martians, and that only salmon, whales, leopards, and bananaslug are in such contact. But if we deny, in the extreme case, thatAni and Sanjay share the same belief, expressed by the sentencesalmon are fish, it seems artificial to draw a sharp line anywhere in the progression of divergence, on one side of whichthey share exactly the same belief about salmon and on the other sideof which they have divergent beliefs. One is thus led to theconclusion that similarity in belief is a matter of degree, and it maythen be difficult to avoid accepting that even a relatively smalldivergence in surrounding beliefs may be sufficient to generate subtledifferences between two beliefs expressed in the same words. Similarslippery slope arguments can be constructed that emphasize gradualbelief change in concept acquisition (Leibniz was ametaphysician agreed to before and after learning philosophy)or gradual change in surrounding theory or in the meaning of a term(electrons have orbits as uttered by Niels Bohr in 1913and as uttered by Richard Feynman in 1980). (This argument is similarin some ways to Stalnakers argument for a possible-worldsanalysis of the propositional contents of beliefsee 3.1.aboveand indeed Stalnaker takes himself, there, to be committedto holism.) Dispositional and interpretational approaches to belief tend to beholist. On these views, recall, to believe is to be disposed toexhibit patterns of behavior interpretable or classifiable by means ofvarious belief attributions (see 1.2 and 1.3 above). It isplausible to suppose that a subjects match to the relevantpatterns will generally be a matter of degree. There may be few actualcases in which two subjects exactly match in their behavioral patternsregarding P, even if it gets matters approximately right toattribute to each of them the belief that P. Since behavioraldispositions are interlaced in a complex way, divergence in any of avariety of attitudes related to P may be sufficient to ensuredivergence in the patterns relevant to P itself. AsAnis associated beliefs grow stranger, her overall behaviorpattern, or dispositional structure, begins to look less and less likeone that we would associate with believing that salmon are fish. It is sometimes objected to holism that, intuitively, both Shakespearesand contemporary physicians believe that blood is red, while on theholist view it is hard to see how their beliefs could even be similar,given that they have so many different surrounding beliefs about bothblood and redness. Although in principle a holist could respond tothis objection by describing what sort of differences in surroundingbelief create only minor divergences and what differences create majorones, there have been no influential attempts at such a project. Holism appears to be incompatible with a certain variety ofrepresentationalism about belief. If beliefs, or the representationsunderlying them, are stored symbols in the mind, somewhat likesentences on a chalkboard or objects in a box (to use standardFodorian metaphors), then it is natural to suppose that those beliefscan, in principle, exist independently of each other. Whether onebelieves P depends on whether a representation with thecontent P is present in the right sort of wayin the mind, which would not seem to be directly affected by whetherQ or not-Q, or R or not-R, is alsorepresented. If there is, in addition, an innate language of thoughtof the sort advocated by Fodor and others, then the basic terms ofthat language may also be exactly the same from person to person. If aview of this sort about the mind can be sufficiently well supported,holism would have to be rejected. Conversely, if holism is plausible,it cuts against the more atomistic forms of representationalism. Fodor and Lepore (1992) contains an excellent if dated review andcritique of arguments for holism. The foremost defenders of holism areprobably Quine (1951) and Davidson (1984). 3.3 De Re Versus De Dicto Belief Attributions Quine (1956) introduced contemporary philosophy of mind to thedistinction between de re and de dicto beliefattributions by means of examples like the following. Ralph sees auspicious-looking man in a trenchcoat and concludes that that man isa spy. Unbeknownst to him, however, the man in the trenchcoat is thenewly elected mayor, Bernard J. Ortcutt, and Ralph would sincerelydeny the claim that the mayor is a spy. So does Ralphbelieve that the mayor is a spy? There appears to be a sense in whichhe does and a sense in which he does not. Philosophers have attempted to characterize the difference between these two senses by saying thatRalph believes de re, of that man (the man in the trenchcoatwho happens also to be the mayor), that he is a spy,while he does not believe de dicto that the mayor is aspy. The standard test for distinguishing de re from de dicto attributions is referential transparency oropacity. A sentence, or more accurately a position in asentence, is held to be referentially transparent if terms or phrasesin that position that refer to the same object can be freelysubstituted without altering the truth of the sentence. The(non-belief attributing) sentence Jill kicked Xis naturally read as referentially transparent in this sense. IfJill kicked the ball is true, then so also is anysentence in which the ball is replaced by a term orphrase that refers to that same ball, e.g., Jill kickedDavys favorite birthday present, Jill kicked thething we bought at Walmart on August 26. Sentences, orpositions, are referentially opaque just in case they are nottransparent, that is, if the substitution of co-referring terms orphrases could potentially alter their truth value. De dictobelief attribution is held to be referentially opaque in this sense.On the de dicto reading of belief, Ralph believes thatthe man in the trenchcoat is a spy may be true whileRalph believes that the mayor is a spy is false.Likewise, on a de dicto reading, Lois Lane believesthat Superman is strong may be true while Lois believesthat Clark Kent is strong is false, even if Superman and ClarkKent are, unbeknownst to Lois, one and the same person. (Regarding theLois example, however, see also 3.5, on Freges Puzzle,below.) In some contexts, the liberal substitution of co-referential terms orphrases seems permissible in ascribing belief. Shifting examples,suppose Davy is a preschooler who has just met a new teacher, Mrs.Sanchez, who is Mexican, and he finds her too strict. Davysmother, in reporting this fact to his father, might say Davythinks Mrs. Sanchez is too strict or Davy thinks the newMexican teacher is too strict, even though Davy does not knowthe teachers name or that she is Mexican. Similarly, if Ralpheventually discovers that the man in the trenchcoat was Ortcutt, and Ralph, in recounting the incident to his friends later, laughinglysay, For a moment, I thought the mayor was a spy! orFor a moment, I thought Ortcutt was a spy. In a dere mood, then, we can say that Davy believes, of X, thatshe is too strict and Ralph believes, of Y, that he is a spy,where X is replaced by any term or phrase that picks out Mrs.Sanchez and Y is replaced by any term or phrase that picksout Ortcuttthough of course, depending on the situation,pragmatic considerations will favor the use of some terms or phrasesover others. In a strict de re sense, perhaps we can even saythat Lois believes, of Clark Kent, that he is strong (though she mayalso simultaneously believe of him that he is not strong). The standard view, then, takes belief-attributing sentences to besystematically ambiguous between a referentially opaque, de dicto structure and a referentially transparent, de restructure. Sometimes this view is conjoined with the view that dere but not de dicto belief requires some kind of directacquaintance with the object of belief. The majority of the literature on the de re / de dicto distinction since at least the 1980s has challenged thisstandard view in one way or another. The challenges are sufficientlydiverse that they resist brief classification, except perhaps toremark that a number of them invoke pragmatics or conversationalcontext, instead of an ambiguity in the term belief, orin the structure of belief ascriptions, to explain the fact that itseems in some way appropriate and in some way inappropriate to saythat Ralph believes the mayor is a spy. Among the more important discussions of the de re / de dicto distinction are Quine (1956), Kaplan (1968), Burge (1977), Lewis (1979), Stich (1983), Dennett (1987), Crimmins (1992), Brandom(1994), Jeshion (2002), Taylor (2002), and Keshet (2010). See also thesupplement on the De Re/De Dicto Distinction in the entry on propositional attitude reports. 3.4 Internalism and Externalism A number of philosophers have suggested that the content ofones beliefs depends entirely on things going on insideones head, and not at all on the external world, except via theeffects of the latter on ones brain. Consequently, if a geniusneuroscientist were to create a molecule-for-molecule duplicate ofyour brain and maintain it in a vat, stimulating it artificially sothat it underwent exactly the same sequence of electrical and chemicalevents as your actual brain, that brain would have exactly the samebeliefs as you. Those who accept this position areinternalists about belief content. Those who reject it areexternalists. Several arguments against internalism have prompted considerabledebate in philosophy of mind. Here is a condensed version of oneargument, due to Putnam (1975, though it should be said thatPutnams original emphasis was on linguistic meaning, not onbelief). Suppose that in 1750, in a far-off region of the universe,there existed a planet that was physically identical to Earth,molecule-for-molecule, in every respect but one: Where Earth hadwater, composed of H2O, Twin Earth had something elseinstead, twater, coming down as rain and fillingstreams, behaving identically to water by all the chemical tests thenavailable, but having a different atomic formula, XYZ. Intuitively, itseems that the inhabitants of Earth in 1750 would have beliefs aboutwater and no beliefs about twater, while the inhabitants of Twin Earthwould have beliefs about twater and no beliefs about water. Byhypothesis, however, each inhabitant of Earth will have a molecularlyidentical counterpart on Twin Earth with exactly the same brainstructures (except, of course, that their brains will contain XYZinstead of H2O, but reflection on analogous examplesregarding chemicals not contained in the brain suggests that this factis irrelevant). Consequently, the argument goes, the contents ofones beliefs do not depend entirely on internal properties ofones brain. For further detail on the debate between internalists andexternalists, see the entries on externalism about the mind and narrow mental content. 3.5 Freges Puzzle Recall that in the de dicto sense (see 3.3 above) itseemed plausible to say that Lois Lane, who does not know that ClarkKent is Superman, believes that Superman is strong but does notbelieve that Clark Kent is strong. Despite the intuitive appeal ofthis view, some widely accepted Russellian views in thephilosophy of language appear committed to attributing to Lois exactlythe same beliefs about Clark Kent as she has about Superman. On suchviews, the semantic content of a name, or the contribution it makes tothe meaning or truth conditions of a sentence, depends only on theindividual picked out by that name. Since the namesSuperman and Clark Kent pick out the sameindividual, it follows that the sentence Lois believes Supermans strong could not have a different meaning or truth valuefrom the sentence Lois believes Clark Kent is strong.Philosophers of language have discussed this issue, known asFreges Puzzle, extensively since the 1970s.Although the issues here arise for all the propositional attitudes (atleast), generally the puzzle is framed and discussed in terms ofbelief. See the entry on propositional attitude reports. 4. Can There Be Belief Without Language? Some philosophers have argued that beings without language, notablyhuman infants and non-human animals, cannot have beliefs. The mostinfluential case for this view has been Davidsons (1982, 1984,Heil 1992). Three primary arguments in favor of the necessity oflanguage for belief can be extracted from Davidson. The first starts from the observation that if we are to ascribe belief to a being without languagea dog, say, who is barking up a tree into which a squirrel has just runwe must ascribe abelief with some particular content. At first blush, it seems naturalto say that, in the case described, the dog believes that the squirrel is in the tree. However, on reflection, that attribution may seem tobe not quite right. The dog does not really have the concept of asquirrel or a tree in the human sense. The dog may not know, forinstance, that trees have roots and require water to grow.Consequently, according to Davidson, it is not really accurate to saythat the dog believes that the squirrel is in the tree (at least in the de dicto sense: see 3.3above). However, Davidson argues, neither does the dog have anyother particular belief. Embracing holism (see 3.2above), Davidson asserts that to have a belief with a specificcontent, that belief must be embedded in a rich network of otherbeliefs with specific contents, but a dogs cognitive life isnt complex enough to support such a network. Belieftalk thus cannot get traction (cf. Dennett 1969; Stich 1979,1983). Several philosophers (e.g., Routley 1981; Smith 1982; Allen 1992;Glock 2010) have objected to this argument on the grounds that thedogs cognition about things such as trees, while perhaps notmuch like ours, is nonetheless relatively rich, involving a number ofelements relatively neglected by us, such as their scent and their usein marking territory. The dogs understanding of a tree may beat least as rich as the human understanding of some objects aboutwhich we seem to have beliefs. For example, it seems that a chemicallyuntrained person may believe that boron is a chemical element withoutknowing very much about boron apart from that fact. Since we have nolanguage for doggy concepts, our belief ascriptions to dogs can onlybe approximatebut if one accepts holism, then belief ascriptionto other human beings may be similarly approximate. Davidson also argues that to have a belief one must have theconcept of belief, which involves the ability to recognize that beliefs can be false or that there is a mind-independent realitybeyond ones beliefs; and that these abilities require language.However, Davidson offers little explicit support for this claim.Furthermore, many developmental psychologists have suggested that children do not understand the appearance-reality distinction and donot recognize that beliefs can be false until they are at least threeyears old (Perner 1991; Wellman, Cross, and Watson 2001; though seeSouthgate, Senju, and Csibra 2007; Scott and Baillargeon 2017).Davidsons view thus requires him either to reject thisempirical thesis or embrace the seemingly implausible view thattwo-year-olds have no beliefs (see also Andrews 2002). The view that belief requires language is a natural consequence of theview that belief attribution is inextricably intertwined with theinterpretation of a subjects linguistic utterances. Davidson,as described above (1.3), argues that the interpretation ofcreatures beliefs, desires, and its language must comettogether as a package. This provides a third Davidsonian reason forrejecting belief without language (a reason that, however, remainslargely implicit in Davidson): Creatures without language are missingpart of what is essential to a behavioral pattern of the sort that canunderwrite proper belief ascription (and recall that on aninterpretational view, all there is to having a belief is having apattern of behavior that is interpretable in that way to an outsideobserver). Any view that ties belief attribution and thesubjects language as closely together as DavidsonsdoesSellars (1956, 1969), Brandom (1994), and Wettstein (2004)also offer views of this sortwill have difficulty accommodatingthe possibility of belief in creatures without language. Thus,whatever draws us to such views will also provide reason to denybelief (or at least robust, full-blown belief) to languagelesscreatures. Positive arguments for attributing beliefs to (at least) human infantsand non-linguistic mammals have tended to focus on the generalbiological and behavioral similarity between adult human beings, humaninfants, and non-human mammals; the naturalness of describing thebehavior of infants and non-linguistic mammals in terms of theirbeliefs and desires; and the difficulty of usefully characterizingtheir mental lives without relying on the ascription of propositionalattitudes (e.g., Routley 1981; Marcus 1995; Allen and Bekoff 1997;Zimmerman 2018; Curry forthcoming).

Wat is fundamentalisme.